Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.103061MaRDI QIDQ6642837zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Steven Kivinen

Publication date 25 November 2024

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.103061

zbMATH Keywords

anonymityequityneutralityPareto efficiencyvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
• Partially efficient voting by committees

Cites work

• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Homogeneous Games. II
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3136272 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3715700 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 706263 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2115087 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
• Transitive permutation groups and equipotent voting rules
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric

Cited in

(3)

• Learning to Design Fair and Private Voting Rules
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff
• Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems

This page was built for publication: Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6642837)