Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.10.004MaRDI QIDQ1886747zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, T. Storcken

Publication date 19 November 2004

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/3043107/guid-b00449bd-3726-4888-83f5-b1919047bcc6-ASSET1.0.pdf, https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/bbc2da32-659e-4ed0-8a53-6f9fda21105d

zbMATH Keywords

Mean rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies

Cited in

(11)

• Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
• Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies
• Fixation results for threshold voter systems
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
• Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy
• False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games Is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

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