Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(17)- When do market games have transferable utility?
- Bargaining in cooperative games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- The compromise value for NTU-games
- On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games. Symmetry versus asymmetry
- The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- Values for Markovian coalition processes
- On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments
- A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
- A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games
- The equal split-off set for NTU-games
- A non-cooperative bargaining procedure generalising the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to NTU games
- Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
- Cooperative games with incomplete information
- Values for two-stage games: Another view of the Shapley axioms
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
This page was built for publication: Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3877447)