Recursive and bargaining values
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The authors introduce two families of values for transferable utility games: the recursive and bargaining values. Bargaining values are obtained as the equilibrium payoffs of the symmetric non-cooperative bargaining game, and have a recursive structure in their definition. They also extend the notions of potential and balanced contributions, to characterize the family of such values. They show that, if a time discount factor is considered in the bargaining model, every bargaining value has its corresponding discounted bargaining value.
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Cites work
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
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- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
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- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
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- Random marginal and random removal values
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Cited in
(6)- Subvaluationism and classical recapture
- Some recursive definitions for linear values of cooperative TU games
- Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
- Second -order average productivity, second-order payoffs, and the solidarity value
- Sequential bargaining with common values
- Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset
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