Structural control in weighted voting games

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0169MaRDI QIDQ2098945zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Anja Rey, Jörg Rothe

Publication date 22 November 2022

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0169

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic game theorycomputational complexitypower indicesstructural controlweighted voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Cooperative games (91A12) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Structural control in weighted voting games
• Weighted electoral control
• Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
• False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
• On the inverse power index problem

Cites work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
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• False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3799016 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
• PP is as Hard as the Polynomial-Time Hierarchy
• PP is closed under truth-table reductions
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• The complexity of power-index comparison
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election

Cited in

(8)

• Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
• Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
• Manipulation in communication structures of graph-restricted weighted voting games
• Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
• Structural control in weighted voting games
• Weighted electoral control
• Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
• Control by adding or deleting edges in graph-restricted weighted voting games

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