Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel
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Publication:745019
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.001zbMath1368.91042MaRDI QIDQ745019
Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal
Publication date: 12 October 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2014-04.pdf
inverse problem; kernel; direct-sum decomposition; average tree solution; invariance to irrelevant coalitions; weighted addition invariance on bi-partitions
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