Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
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Publication:420828
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2011.12.003zbMATH Open1238.91056OpenAlexW2269108872MaRDI QIDQ420828FDOQ420828
Authors: Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind 
Publication date: 23 May 2012
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2011.12.003
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Cooperative games (91A12) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Voting theory (91B12)
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Cited In (22)
- Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Complexity of computing the Shapley value in partition function form games
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
- Average weights and power in weighted voting games
- Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
- Some open problems in simple games
- Answers set programs for non-transferable utility games: expressiveness, complexity and applications
- Proof systems and transformation games
- Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value
- Mathematical and computational modeling of political systems
- Manipulation in communication structures of graph-restricted weighted voting games
- Worst-case bounds on power vs. proportion in weighted voting games with an application to false-name manipulation
- Forms of representation for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences
- Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
- Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
- An exploration of the application of the Banzhaf power index to weighted voting systems
- False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
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