Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:420828)
Recommendations
- On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
- Weighted voting games
- Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6868551
- Average weights and power in weighted voting games
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3888913 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44384 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1766750 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
- A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
- A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
- A short proof of Sperner's lemma
- False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
- NP-completeness of some problems concerning voting games
- On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
- On the inverse power index problem
- Probabilistic polynomial time is closed under parity reductions
- The Complexity of Planar Counting Problems
- The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
- The complexity of power-index comparison
- The inverse Banzhaf problem
- The polynomial-time hierarchy and sparse oracles
- Voting power in the governance of the international monetary fund
Cited in
(22)- An exploration of the application of the Banzhaf power index to weighted voting systems
- False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
- Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6868551 (Why is no real title available?)
- Complexity of computing the Shapley value in partition function form games
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Average weights and power in weighted voting games
- Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
- Some open problems in simple games
- Answers set programs for non-transferable utility games: expressiveness, complexity and applications
- Proof systems and transformation games
- Mathematical and computational modeling of political systems
- Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value
- Manipulation in communication structures of graph-restricted weighted voting games
- Worst-case bounds on power vs. proportion in weighted voting games with an application to false-name manipulation
- Forms of representation for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences
- Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
- Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
This page was built for publication: Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q420828)
