A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size

DOI10.1111/IJET.12381MaRDI QIDQ6180343zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Rajnish Kumar, Sudipta Sarangi

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12381

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuesolidarityegalitarian Shapley valueequal division rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
• The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
• Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games

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