A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size
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Publication:6180343
DOI10.1111/ijet.12381zbMath1528.91006OpenAlexW4379654729MaRDI QIDQ6180343
Sudipta Sarangi, Surajit Borkotokey, Rajnish Kumar, Dhrubajit Choudhury
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12381
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