A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size
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Publication:6180343
DOI10.1111/IJET.12381zbMATH Open1528.91006OpenAlexW4379654729MaRDI QIDQ6180343FDOQ6180343
Authors: Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Rajnish Kumar, Sudipta Sarangi 
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12381
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