Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
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Publication:503064
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.007zbMath1400.91017OpenAlexW2560135860MaRDI QIDQ503064
Publication date: 11 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.007
Related Items (13)
The equal collective gains value in cooperative games ⋮ Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values ⋮ Gain-loss and new axiomatizations of the Shapley value ⋮ Marginality and the position value ⋮ Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games ⋮ Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems ⋮ Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited ⋮ Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
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