Tender Offers and Leverage

DOI10.1162/0033553042476198zbMATH Open1099.91525OpenAlexW3121973438MaRDI QIDQ4672015FDOQ4672015

Authors: Holger M. Müller, Fausto Panunzi 

Publication date: 29 April 2005

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26714

Recommendations

• Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers
• Shareholder information and partial tender offers
• TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH
• Information in tender offers with a large shareholder
• Leverage, premium and timing in corporate acquisitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cited In (6)

• Shareholder information and partial tender offers
• A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
• Information in tender offers with a large shareholder
• Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers
• Leverage, premium and timing in corporate acquisitions
• Jump bidding in ascending auctions: the case of takeover contests

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