Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers

DOI10.3982/ECTA6178MaRDI QIDQ3535758zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Robert Marquez, Bilge Yılmaz

Publication date 14 November 2008

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyshareholder informationtender offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Recommendations

• Shareholder information and partial tender offers
• Information in tender offers with a large shareholder
• On the generic efficiency of takeovers under incomplete information
• Tender Offers and Leverage
• TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH

Cited in

(9)

• On the optimality of partial tender offers
• Target-initiated takeover with search frictions
• Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover?
• The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm *
• Tender Offers and Leverage
• A pre-emption model of mergers
• Shareholder information and partial tender offers
• Buying shares and/or votes for corporate control
• Information in tender offers with a large shareholder

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