Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers

DOI10.3982/ECTA6178zbMATH Open1152.91470MaRDI QIDQ3535758FDOQ3535758

Authors: Robert Marquez, Bilge Yılmaz 

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Shareholder information and partial tender offers
• Information in tender offers with a large shareholder
• On the generic efficiency of takeovers under incomplete information
• Tender Offers and Leverage
• TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyshareholder informationtender offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Cited In (8)

• On the optimality of partial tender offers
• The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm *
• Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover?
• Tender Offers and Leverage
• A pre-emption model of mergers
• Shareholder information and partial tender offers
• Buying shares and/or votes for corporate control
• Information in tender offers with a large shareholder

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