Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.04.016MaRDI QIDQ991345zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Tracy R. Lewis

Publication date 7 September 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.016

zbMATH Keywords

auctioninterdependent valuesbreakup feescorporate takeover

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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