The catering of controlling shareholders, investor sentiment and corporate investment efficiency

DOI10.1080/09720529.2016.1178906OpenAlexW2466002428MaRDI QIDQ5069804FDOQ5069804

Authors: Zhaohui Zhu, Z. C. Zhao, Han-Tao Bao 

Publication date: 19 April 2022

Published in: Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/09720529.2016.1178906

Recommendations

• Large shareholders, control contestability and firm productive efficiency
• Corporate control and real investment in incomplete markets
• A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
• Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics: toward pure managerial firms?
• Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control
• Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict

zbMATH Keywords

investor sentimentinvestment efficiencycateringcontrolling shareholders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cited In (2)

• Is corporate control effective when managers face investment timing decisions in incomplete markets?
• Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance*

This page was built for publication: The catering of controlling shareholders, investor sentiment and corporate investment efficiency

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5069804)