Large shareholders, control contestability and firm productive efficiency
DOI10.1007/S10479-019-03402-ZzbMATH Open1461.91164OpenAlexW2975774922WikidataQ127175400 ScholiaQ127175400MaRDI QIDQ828862FDOQ828862
Sabri Boubaker, Riadh Manita, Wael Rouatbi
Publication date: 5 May 2021
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03402-z
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Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special problems of linear programming (transportation, multi-index, data envelopment analysis, etc.) (90C08)
Cites Work
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- The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
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Cited In (4)
- Disentangling the sources of bank inefficiency: a two-stage network multi-directional efficiency analysis approach
- Managing bank performance under COVID‐19: A novel inverse DEA efficiency approach
- Large shareholding and firm value in the alternative investment market (AIM)
- The catering of controlling shareholders, investor sentiment and corporate investment efficiency
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