Large shareholders, control contestability and firm productive efficiency

DOI10.1007/S10479-019-03402-ZMaRDI QIDQ828862zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sabri Boubaker, Riadh Manita, Wael Rouatbi

Publication date 5 May 2021

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03402-z

zbMATH Keywords

productivitydata envelopment analysislarge shareholdersmultiple large shareholdersOlley and Pakes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special problems of linear programming (transportation, multi-index, data envelopment analysis, etc.) (90C08)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1016360 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1538089 (Why is no real title available?)
• A classification of DEA models when the internal structure of the decision making units is considered
• A data envelopment analysis approach to measure the mutual fund performance
• Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control
• Efficiency of mutual funds and portfolio performance measurement: A non-parametric approach
• Evaluation of credit risk based on firm performance
• Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
• Measuring the efficiency of decision making units
• Recent developments in DEA. The mathematical programming approach to frontier analysis
• Review of methods for increasing discrimination in data envelopment analysis
• Some Models for Estimating Technical and Scale Inefficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis
• The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
• The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry

Cited in

(6)

• Corporate groups and minority shareholder wealth: A role for private benefits?
• Disentangling the sources of bank inefficiency: a two-stage network multi-directional efficiency analysis approach
• The catering of controlling shareholders, investor sentiment and corporate investment efficiency
• Corporate control and executive selection
• Managing bank performance under COVID‐19: A novel inverse DEA efficiency approach
• Large shareholding and firm value in the alternative investment market (AIM)

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• opreg

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