The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public

DOI10.1162/003355398555568zbMath0940.91034OpenAlexW2151458238MaRDI QIDQ4264325

Ailsa Röell, Marco Pagano

Publication date: 16 September 1999

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ff813c4e0a7ef43897af8f27fb31554379ccd64a

zbMATH Keywords

measure of dispersioncompany's controlling shareholderoptimal ownership structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (2)

Large shareholders, control contestability and firm productive efficiency ⋮ Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

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