Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry

DOI10.3934/jimo.2021167OpenAlexW3202928160MaRDI QIDQ2171121

Zhiping Zhou, Yao Yin, Panos M. Pardalos, Hao Cheng, Mi Zhou

Publication date: 23 September 2022

Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2021167

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationperformance measureStackelberg gameequity-based incentivemanagerial task

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

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