Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
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Publication:1795028
DOI10.1007/S10700-016-9263-7zbMath1429.91194OpenAlexW2554167843MaRDI QIDQ1795028
Yanfei Lan, Ruiqing Zhao, Zhi Hua Chen
Publication date: 16 October 2018
Published in: Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10700-016-9263-7
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Cites Work
- Uncertain agency models with multi-dimensional incomplete information based on confidence level
- Extreme value theorems of uncertain process with application to insurance risk model
- An uncertain contract model for rural migrant worker's employment problems
- Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options
- Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- A fuzzy supply chain contract problem with pricing and warranty
- Uncertainty theory
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