The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
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Cites work
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
- Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Ranking agencies under moral hazard
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
Cited in
(6)- The value of preference information in agency relationships
- Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry
- On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard
- The strategically ignorant principal
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
- Information design in the principal-agent problem
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