The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
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Publication:665107
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.07.002zbMath1279.91109OpenAlexW2050616029MaRDI QIDQ665107
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002
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Cites Work
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Ranking agencies under moral hazard
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
- Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
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