When do creditors with heterogeneous beliefs agree to run?
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Publication:2339117
DOI10.1007/s00780-015-0259-xzbMath1319.91152MaRDI QIDQ2339117
Andreea Minca, Johannes Wissel, Andrey Krishenik
Publication date: 30 March 2015
Published in: Finance and Stochastics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-015-0259-x
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B70: Stochastic models in economics
91A07: Games with infinitely many players
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
91G40: Credit risk
91B69: Heterogeneous agent models
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