Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect

DOI10.3982/TE2449MaRDI QIDQ4991726zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors D. Gerardi, Lucas Maestri

Publication date 3 June 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2449

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic contractinglimited commitmentratchet effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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(21)

• Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task
• Screening by mode of trade
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
• Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• The curse of long horizons
• Repeated contracting without commitment
• Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1984097 (Why is no real title available?)
• Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
• Progressive learning
• The ratchet effect: a learning perspective
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
• Sequential veto bargaining with incomplete information
• Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
• Grouping agents with persistent types
• Contraction: On the decision-theoretical origins of minimal change and entrenchment
• Dynamic screening with limited commitment

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