Grouping agents with persistent types

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.03.008MaRDI QIDQ6967126zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors James M. Malcomson

Publication date 26 June 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

persistent private informationrelational incentive contractsrenegotiation-proofnesstype pooling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites work

• A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
• A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
• Game theory
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
• Progressive learning
• Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts

This page was built for publication: Grouping agents with persistent types

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6967126)