Transforming monitoring structures with resilient encoders -- application to repeated games

DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0058-3zbMath1276.91029arXiv1210.6241OpenAlexW3105513780MaRDI QIDQ367447

Maël Le Treust, Samson Lasaulce

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.6241

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesrepeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect monitoringsource codingarbitrarily varying sourceinformation constraintobservation structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• A Mathematical Theory of Communication
• General properties of long-run supergames
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• A proof of Marton's coding theorem for the discrete memoryless broadcast channel (Corresp.)
• The zero-error side information problem and chromatic numbers (Corresp.)
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Optimal Use of Communication Resources
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Noiseless coding of correlated information sources
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item