Transforming monitoring structures with resilient encoders -- application to repeated games
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Publication:367447
DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0058-3zbMath1276.91029arXiv1210.6241OpenAlexW3105513780MaRDI QIDQ367447
Maël Le Treust, Samson Lasaulce
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.6241
dynamic gamesrepeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect monitoringsource codingarbitrarily varying sourceinformation constraintobservation structure
Cites Work
- A Mathematical Theory of Communication
- General properties of long-run supergames
- Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
- Internal correlation in repeated games
- A proof of Marton's coding theorem for the discrete memoryless broadcast channel (Corresp.)
- The zero-error side information problem and chromatic numbers (Corresp.)
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- Optimal Use of Communication Resources
- Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Noiseless coding of correlated information sources
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