Self-evident events and the value of linking

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105691zbMath1527.91017MaRDI QIDQ6072237

Wenzhang Zhang, Jimmy Chan

Publication date: 12 October 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesrepeated partnershipsgeneral monitoringself-evident eventsvalue of linking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Folk theorem with communication
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Agreeing to disagree
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Common Learning
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
• Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
• Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
• Mediated Partnerships
• Communication and cooperation in repeated games
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
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