Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals

DOI10.3982/TE1369zbMATH Open1395.91042MaRDI QIDQ4586067FDOQ4586067

Authors: Jimmy Chan, Wenzhang Zhang 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamesprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cited In (2)

• Self-evident events and the value of linking
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals

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