Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1239/jap/1152413726zbMath1171.91317MaRDI QIDQ3410917

Yunshyong Chow, Hsiao-Chi Chen, June Hsieh

Publication date: 16 November 2006

Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1152413726

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect monitoring; coordination game; quasi-Bayesian learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

60K99: Special processes

60G99: Stochastic processes

91A22: Evolutionary games

60F99: Limit theorems in probability theory

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Cites Work

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