Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)90028-0zbMATH Open0925.90141OpenAlexW1515021144MaRDI QIDQ1329675FDOQ1329675

Authors: P. Levine, Andrew Brociner 

Publication date: 4 September 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)90028-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations
• Recursive Models of Dynamic Linear Economies
• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?

Cited In (4)

• Three-country trade relations: A discrete dynamic game approach
• On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games
• Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games
• Is there a tragedy of a common central bank?

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