Is there a tragedy of a common central bank?

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00939-6zbMATH0900.90138WikidataQ57787442MaRDI QIDQ673258FDOQ673258

Authors Bas van Aarle, A. Lans Bovenberg, Matthias G. Raith

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic gamesEuropean central bankPolicy coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Central bank independence and public debt policy
• Game of thrones: accommodating monetary policies in a monetary union
• Optimal decision rules in a monetary union
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45907 (Why is no real title available?)
• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach
• Optimal economic stabilization policies under decentralized control and conflicting objectives

Cited in

(5)

• DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU
• Debt redemption fund and fiscal incentives
• Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia
• The tragedy of the commons and inflation bias in the euro area
• The accomplishment of the Maastricht criteria with respect to initial debt

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