Is there a tragedy of a common central bank?

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00939-6MaRDI QIDQ673258zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Bas van Aarle, A. Lans Bovenberg, Matthias G. Raith

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00939-6

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic gamesEuropean central bankPolicy coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45907 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal economic stabilization policies under decentralized control and conflicting objectives

Cited in

(6)

• The accomplishment of the Maastricht criteria with respect to initial debt
• Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia
• The tragedy of the commons and inflation bias in the euro area
• Debt redemption fund and fiscal incentives
• DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU
• Stabilizing public debt through a Stackelberg game between government and central bank: a differential game-theoretic approach

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