Is there a tragedy of a common central bank?

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00939-6zbMATH Open0900.90138WikidataQ57787442 ScholiaQ57787442MaRDI QIDQ673258FDOQ673258

Matthias G. Raith, Bas van Aarle, A. Lans Bovenberg

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic gamesEuropean central bankPolicy coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Optimal economic stabilization policies under decentralized control and conflicting objectives
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach

Cited In (4)

• Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia
• The accomplishment of the Maastricht criteria with respect to initial debt
• DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU
• Debt redemption fund and fiscal incentives

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