DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU

DOI10.1017/S1365100507060038zbMath1186.91040MaRDI QIDQ5292497

Andrew Hughes Hallett, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Nicola Acocella

Publication date: 21 June 2007

Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites Work

• Is there a tragedy of a common central bank?
• Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: controllability in policy games
• Feedback Nash equilibria in the scalar infinite horizon LQ-game
• The solution set of the N-player scalar feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations
• Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU.