Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: controllability in policy games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.08.002MaRDI QIDQ1929033zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 7 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12178/files/wp050132.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium existencepolicy gamespolicy ineffectivenessstatic controllability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Controllability (93B05)

Recommendations

• Tinbergen controllability and \(n\)-player LQ-games
• Controllability in policy games: Policy neutrality and the theory of economic policy revisited
• DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48309
• Controllability and the theory of economic policy: a structural approach

Cites work

• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

Cited in

(7)

• Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games
• Tinbergen controllability and \(n\)-player LQ-games
• ``Whatever it takes: a plea for active monetary policies
• Controllability and the theory of economic policy: a structural approach
• Towards a new theory of economic policy: continuity and innovation
• DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU
• Controllability in policy games: Policy neutrality and the theory of economic policy revisited

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