Central bank independence and public debt policy
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Publication:1391769
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00003-1zbMath0901.90073MaRDI QIDQ1391769
A. Lans Bovenberg, Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Publication date: 23 July 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00003-1
central bank independence; policy coordination; (optimal) debt targets; optimal preferences; political distortions; price stability weights; strategic debt management
91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)
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