Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts
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Publication:4272863
Recommendations
- Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
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- Uncertainty aversion and theory of incomplete contract
- Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
- Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
- Incomplete contract, transaction-specific investment, and bargaining power
- Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
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(5)- Quality distortions in vertical relations
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing
- Gain versus loss contracts: does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?
- Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
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