Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts

DOI10.2307/2527187MaRDI QIDQ4272863zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Bac

Publication date 2 January 1994

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11693/49375

zbMATH Keywords

buyer-seller relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
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Cited in

(5)

• Quality distortions in vertical relations
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing
• Gain versus loss contracts: does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?
• Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade

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