On the design of peer punishment experiments

DOI10.1007/S10683-005-0869-9MaRDI QIDQ816752zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Casari

Publication date 23 February 2006

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationexperimentspublic goodscommon-pool resourcessanctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment
• Self-governance in generalized exchange. A laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment
• Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
• Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour: an experiment
• Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
• The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
• In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments

Cites work

• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

Cited in

(12)

• In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
• Anger management: aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods
• Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game
• Conditional punishment
• Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence
• The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action
• Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism: an experimental investigation
• What norms trigger punishment?

This page was built for publication: On the design of peer punishment experiments

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q816752)