Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism: an experimental investigation

DOI10.3390/g4010089zbMath1314.91088OpenAlexW2161692260MaRDI QIDQ2351213

Bin Xu, Fei Song, Liangcong Fan, C. Bram Cadsby

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4010089

zbMATH Keywords

public goodslarge groupspunishment mechanismmarginal per capita returnMPCR

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Coordination on bubbles in large-group asset pricing experiments

Cites Work

• On the design of peer punishment experiments
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare

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