Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2006.01.003zbMath1154.91619OpenAlexW2061697139WikidataQ47220117 ScholiaQ47220117MaRDI QIDQ2500417

Marcus W. Feldman, Ken-Ichi Aoki, Jeremy R. Kendal

Publication date: 23 August 2006

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2006.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

Cultural driftCultural evolutionMetanormNorm adoptionPunishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Monte Carlo methods (65C05) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (2)

How inconsistency between attitude and behavior persists through cultural transmission ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity

Cites Work

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• Assortative mating, selection and mutation models for continuous variation: A reply to Felsenstein
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Spread of two linked social norms on complex interaction networks
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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