Self-organization for collective action: an experimental study of voting on sanction regimes

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDT022zbMATH Open1405.91156OpenAlexW2104571450MaRDI QIDQ4610643FDOQ4610643

Authors: Thomas Markussen, Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran 

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt022

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zbMATH Keywords

experimentcooperationvotingpunishmentformal sanctionsinformal sanctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (13)

• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence
• Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups?
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
• The role of the decision-making regime on cooperation in a workgroup social dilemma: an examination of cyberloafing
• Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
• Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
• Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games
• Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma
• The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action
• Political support and civil disobedience: a social interaction approach
• Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games

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