EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH TWO INDEPENDENT DECISIONS
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Publication:4521371
DOI10.1142/S0219198900000081zbMath1073.91516OpenAlexW1979004417MaRDI QIDQ4521371
Ross Cressman, Jean-François Wen, Andrea Gaunersdorfer
Publication date: 2000
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000081
Related Items (7)
Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games ⋮ Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Eco-evolutionary logic of mutualisms ⋮ An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in the multigame on a two-layer square network ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
Cites Work
- On the dynamics of asymmetric games
- Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. II. Games between two populations without selfinteraction
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
- Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification
- An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games
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