EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH TWO INDEPENDENT DECISIONS
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Cites work
- An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
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Cited in
(12)- On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
- Evolutionary stability for two-stage hawk-dove games
- Evolutionary game theory with two groups of individuals
- An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games
- Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics
- Evolution of cooperation in the multigame on a two-layer square network
- Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games
- Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5583322 (Why is no real title available?)
- Eco-evolutionary logic of mutualisms
- Evolution of cooperation in spatial heterogeneous social dilemmas with dynamic self-adaptive matching
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