Evolutionary dynamics of finite populations in games with polymorphic fitness equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2007.03.004MaRDI QIDQ2219730zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sevan G. Ficici, Jordan B. Pollack

Publication date 21 January 2021

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

finite populationpolymorphic fitness equilibriumreplicator dynamicssampling errorselection pressure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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Cites work

• Computing the fundamental matrix for a nonirreducible Markov chain
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Generalized urn models of evolutionary processes.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148873 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1237738 (Why is no real title available?)
• Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
• Mathematical population genetics. I: Theoretical introduction.
• The many-demes limit for selection and drift in a subdivided population
• Urn models, replicator processes, and random genetic drift

Cited in

(14)

• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
• Stochastic dynamics in the fitness-based process which can be on behalf of the standard Moran, local and Wright-Fisher processes
• Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The impact of truncation selection and diffusion on cooperation in spatial games
• Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
• Asymmetric games in monomorphic and polymorphic populations
• Extreme selection unifies evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations
• Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots
• Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
• Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
• Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games
• Truncation selection and payoff distributions applied to the replicator equation
• Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
• Linear programming for computing equilibria under truncation selection and designing defensive strategies against malicious opponents

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