Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots

DOI10.1007/S00285-014-0770-2MaRDI QIDQ2512943zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yohei Nakajima, Naoki Masuda

Publication date 2 February 2015

Published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.2273

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Brownian motions and diffusion theory (population genetics, absorption problems, etc.) (60J70) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial outcome. We study fixation time in this scenario. We show that the fixation time is divided into three main regimes, in one of which the fixation time is short, and in the other two the fixation time is exponentially long in terms of the population size. Different from the case without zealots, there is a threshold selection intensity below which the fixation is fast for an arbitrary payoff matrix. We illustrate our results with examples of various social dilemma games.

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Cited in

(6)

• Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint
• Opinion control in complex networks
• Cooperation driven by alike interactions in presence of social viscosity
• Breaking coexistence: zealotry vs nonlinear social impact
• Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria
• Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach

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