Under high stakes and uncertainty the rich should lend the poor a helping hand

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.10.004zbMATH Open1411.91079OpenAlexW2154583624WikidataQ47966868 ScholiaQ47966868MaRDI QIDQ2632407FDOQ2632407

Authors Maria Abou Chakra, Arne Traulsen

Publication date 14 May 2019

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneityevolutionary dynamicsevolutionary game theorypublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3702466 (Why is no real title available?)
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process

Cited in

(7)

• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• Reducing the bystander effect via decreasing group size to solve the collective-risk social dilemma
• Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: a volunteer's dilemma experiment
• Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games
• Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection
• Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games

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