Under high stakes and uncertainty the rich should lend the poor a helping hand
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Publication:2632407
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.10.004zbMATH Open1411.91079OpenAlexW2154583624WikidataQ47966868 ScholiaQ47966868MaRDI QIDQ2632407FDOQ2632407
Authors: Maria Abou Chakra, Arne Traulsen
Publication date: 14 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.10.004
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Cites Work
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
- Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas
Cited In (7)
- Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
- Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: a volunteer's dilemma experiment
- Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection
- Reducing the bystander effect via decreasing group size to solve the collective-risk social dilemma
- Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games
- Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
- Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
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