Under high stakes and uncertainty the rich should lend the poor a helping hand
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Publication:2632407
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3702466 (Why is no real title available?)
- Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
Cited in
(7)- Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
- Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
- Reducing the bystander effect via decreasing group size to solve the collective-risk social dilemma
- Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: a volunteer's dilemma experiment
- Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games
- Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection
- Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
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