Under high stakes and uncertainty the rich should lend the poor a helping hand

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.10.004zbMATH Open1411.91079OpenAlexW2154583624WikidataQ47966868 ScholiaQ47966868MaRDI QIDQ2632407FDOQ2632407

Arne Traulsen, Maria Abou Chakra

Publication date: 14 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneityevolutionary dynamicsevolutionary game theorypublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas

Cited In (5)

• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection
• Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games

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