How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for \(2\times 2\) prisoner's dilemma game works for emerging cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2015.07.006zbMath1400.91078OpenAlexW985804069MaRDI QIDQ1618798

Hirokji Sagara, Jun Tanimoto

Publication date: 13 November 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2015.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

normevolutionary gameprisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Does information of how good or bad your neighbors are enhance cooperation in spatial prisoner's games? ⋮ Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game ⋮ Match making in complex social networks

Cites Work

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• Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
• Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games
• The beneficial role of random strategies in social and financial systems
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas

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