Evolution of cooperation in rotating indivisible goods game

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.12.030zbMath1406.91040OpenAlexW2036656913WikidataQ51730001 ScholiaQ51730001MaRDI QIDQ1715459

Mayuko Nakamaru, Shimpei Koike, Masahiro Tsujimoto

Publication date: 4 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.12.030

zbMATH Keywords

evolutioncooperationinstitutionpeer selectionROSCA

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Large group size promotes the evolution of cooperation in the mutual-aid game ⋮ The roles of particle swarm intelligence in the prisoner's dilemma based on continuous and mixed strategy systems on scale-free networks

Cites Work

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• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games
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• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• Spatial effects in social dilemmas
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• Corrigendum to ``The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice

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