Gossip: Perspective taking to establish cooperation

DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00440-4zbMATH Open1505.91046OpenAlexW4220982462MaRDI QIDQ2105695FDOQ2105695

Károly Takács, Simone Righi

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00440-4

Recommendations

• Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information
• Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
• A model for gossip-mediated evolution of altruism with various types of false information by speakers and assessment by listeners
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Gossip and the efficiency of interactions

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationprisoner's dilemmareputationindirect reciprocitygossip

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations -- an experimental study

Cited In (3)

• Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
• Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
• Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game

This page was built for publication: Gossip: Perspective taking to establish cooperation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2105695)