scientific article; zbMATH DE number 952977

zbMATH Open0861.90148MaRDI QIDQ4717892FDOQ4717892

Authors: Toshio Yamagishi, Nobuyuki Takahashi 

Publication date: 7 January 1997

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

simulationsocial dilemmasecond-order social dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (9)

• What norms trigger punishment?
• Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
• Evolution of norms in a multi-level selection model of conflict and cooperation
• The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game
• Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation
• Effect of Mutual Choice Metanorm in Group Dynamics for Solving Social Dilemmas
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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