Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts
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Publication:5932221
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00056-1zbMath0984.91006OpenAlexW2132104117WikidataQ57943596 ScholiaQ57943596MaRDI QIDQ5932221
Dieter Balkenborg, Mathijs Jansen, Dries Vermeulen
Publication date: 23 April 2002
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00056-1
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