Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00328-WzbMath1444.91043OpenAlexW3121572848MaRDI QIDQ778091

Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00328-w

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysubgame perfect equilibriumdecision problemmultiple selvescurb sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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