Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00328-WMaRDI QIDQ778091zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date 30 June 2020

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00328-w

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysubgame perfect equilibriummultiple selvesdecision problemcurb sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems
• Robust Markov perfect equilibria
• Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting
• Markov perfect equilibria in a dynamic decision model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting
• Investment and consumption without commitment

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 700091 (Why is no real title available?)
• Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
• An axiomatization of minimal curb sets
• Consistent Plans
• Discounted Dynamic Programming
• Doing it now, later, or never
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Learning by forgetful players
• Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
• On dynamic programming: Compactness of the space of policies
• On finding curb sets in extensive games
• On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing
• Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics
• Stochastic Games
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form

This page was built for publication: Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q778091)