Doing it now, later, or never
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.007zbMATH Open1347.91054OpenAlexW2185021694MaRDI QIDQ290176FDOQ290176
Authors: Kutay Cingiz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski, János Flesch 
Publication date: 1 June 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/35435269/Herings_2016_Doing_it_Now_Later_or_Never.pdf
Recommendations
- General stopping behaviors of naïve and noncommitted sophisticated agents, with application to probability distortion
- Time-consistent stopping under decreasing impatience
- Games with possibly naive present-biased players
- Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting
- The optimal equilibrium for time-inconsistent stopping problems -- the discrete-time case
centipede gamesnaive playerssophisticated playerssubgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibriatime-inconsistent preferencesupper semi-continuous functions
Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Games in extensive form (91A18)
Cites Work
- Perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs
- Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs
- Periodic stopping games
- On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing
- Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations
- Existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic altruistic growth economies
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences
- Existence of Secure Equilibrium in Multi-player Games with Perfect Information
- Intertemporally Inconsistent Preferences and the Rate of Consumption
- Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time
- Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model
Cited In (5)
- Games with possibly naive present-biased players
- A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players
- Perfect information games where each player acts only once
- Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do
- Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment
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