Adaptive learning and p-best response sets

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0266-2MaRDI QIDQ647357zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacques Durieu, Philippe Solal, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date 23 November 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0266-2

zbMATH Keywords

\(p\)-dominanceevolutionary game theoryfictitious play processstochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• p-best response set
• \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
• An approach to equilibrium selection
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning by forgetful players
• On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information

Cited in

(7)

• Learning by forgetful players
• \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
• Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
• Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games
• Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment
• A characterization of stochastically stable networks
• p-best response set

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