Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.06.005MaRDI QIDQ2675449zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anne-Christine Barthel, Tarun Sabarwal, Eric J. Hoffmann

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

\(p\)-best response set\(p\)-dominanceminimal \(p\)-best response setstrategic complementsstrategic substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cites work

• p-best response set
• \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
• \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
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• Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Games with strategic complements and substitutes
• Generalized belief operator and robustness in binary-action supermodular games
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134656 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monotone games. A unified approach to games with strategic complements and substitutes
• On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
• On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
• Ordinal aggregation results via Karlin's variation diminishing property
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice

Cited in

(4)

• Characterizing monotone games
• Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution against Boundedly Rational Followers
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games

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