Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
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Publication:2675449
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.005zbMath1498.91017OpenAlexW3049736005MaRDI QIDQ2675449
Anne-Christine Barthel, Tarun Sabarwal, Eric J. Hoffmann
Publication date: 23 September 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.005
strategic complementsstrategic substitutes\(p\)-dominance\(p\)-best response setminimal \(p\)-best response set
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