Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
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Publication:2278911
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Cites work
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
Cited in
(15)- Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes
- The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
- A global game with strategic substitutes and complements
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Uniform selection in global games
- Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
- Games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Global games with strategic substitutes
- Strategic substitutes or complements? The game of where to fish
- Panics and prices
- Entry under placement uncertainty
- Interval-valued quasisupermodular function and monotone comparative statics
- A global game with strategic substitutes and complements: comment
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