A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games
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Publication:1786790
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.10.008zbMATH Open1398.91021OpenAlexW2758334104MaRDI QIDQ1786790FDOQ1786790
Authors: Finn Christensen 
Publication date: 25 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://webapps.towson.edu/cbe/economics/workingpapers/2017-04.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Potential games
- On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
- Multiplicity of Equilibria and Comparative Statics
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
- A Third Remark on the Number of Equilibria of an Economy
- Two Remarks on the Number of Equilibria of an Economy
- Correlated equilibrium and potential games
- The system stability of dynamic processes
- A strong correspondence principle for smooth, monotone environments
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (4)
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