A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games
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Cites work
- A strong correspondence principle for smooth, monotone environments
- A Third Remark on the Number of Equilibria of an Economy
- Correlated equilibrium and potential games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50712 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3221041 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multiplicity of Equilibria and Comparative Statics
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
- On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
- Potential games
- The system stability of dynamic processes
- Two Remarks on the Number of Equilibria of an Economy
Cited in
(5)- A strong correspondence principle for smooth, monotone environments
- Mean-variance analysis of the newsvendor problem with price-dependent, isoelastic demand
- Comparative statics and heterogeneity
- Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
- Correlated equilibrium of games with concave potential functions
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